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PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT,POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT: 1978-1982 
Anthony Leddin* 
Introduction 
This paper is concerned with exammmg certain aspects of the Central 
Bank's quantitative credit guidelines over the period 1978 to 1982. The 
sectoral or personal lending guidelines are not considered in this paper. The 
approach is to consider first the policy aspects to the guidelines and in 
particular the relationship between the guideline and the external reserve 
objective. Secondly, the issue of neutralization of interest rates is discussed and 
some evidence is presented on this matter. Finally, the paper examines how 
Central Bank enforcement may act as an indicator of the existence and timing 
of credit rationing and concludes by demonstrating how policy and 
enforcement combined to cause a reduction in the Associated Banks' relative 
lending share. 
Polz'cy 
Credit guidelines were first issued in Ireland in 1965. During the period 
1965-1977 the Central Bank's credit policy was on the whole passive with the 
probable exception of the years 1965, 1973 and 1974 when attempts were 
made to restrain the growth of domestic credit. Table 1 presents the guidelines 
and the outcomes for the period 1978 to 1982. It is evident from the Table that 
the first two guidelines were not successful in restricting lending to the private 
sector whereas the remaining three guidelines were successful in this regard. 
The first guideline was, in fact, terminated in August 1978 when it became 
apparent that the guideline would be breached and a six-month guideline was 
introduced with the intention of moderating credit in the final months of 1978. 
An interim guideline was introduced from 1979 onwards and, most signifi-
cantly, foreign currency based lending (FCBL) was allowed exemption from 
the 1979 and 1980 guidelines. 
The basic rationale for the credit guideline is not to control the money 
supply in the economy but to influence its composition between its domestic 
and external sources. By this means an external reserve objective can be 
achieved. This may be illustrated by reference to the following identity which 
is derived from the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system. 
*The author is Lecturer in Economics at the NIHE, Limerick. 
My thanks to Joe Durkan for comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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TABLE I: Private Sector Guidelines 1978-1981 
Foreign Currency Excess 
No. Period Guideline Outcome Based Lending Lending 
% % £m £m 
Dec 77 - Dec 78 20 33 320.7 
2 Sep 78 - Mar 79 10 14.7 158.1 
3 Feb 79 - Feb 80 18 19.3 129.1 46.8 
Interim 10 13.3 
4 Feb 80 - Feb 81 13 13.3 323.6 16.5 
Interim 7 1.3 
5 Feb 81 - Feb 82 15 15.3 15.5 
Interim 8 4.1 
Source: Various Central Bank Bulletins 
Notes: l. Guideline 1: Terminated August 1978 
2. Guideline 3: Backdated one month on date of issue 
3. Guideline 4: Foreign Currency Base Lending (FCBL) exemption terminated in October 1980 
1. R + NEALBs = Ms - (NGL + BLG + OTHERS) 
where R = External Reserves; NEALBs = Net External Assets of the Licensed 
Banks; Ms = Money Supply; BLG = Bank Lending to the Government; NGL 
= Non Government Lending. The 'OTHERS' variable is closely related to the 
banks' net non monetary assets. The sum of the terms in the bracket is referred 
to as Domestic Credit (DC). 
The money supply is determined by the demand for money which in turn is 
assumed to be a stable function of a few variables. 1 If the Central Bank's 
objective is to have no change in the external reserves, then the Central Bank 
must ensure that the change in DC is in line with the change in the money 
supply. The NGL variable within the overall DC variable is controlled by the 
quantitative credit guideline. Thus in setting the guideline the Central Bank 
must estimate correctly the likely change in each variable in identity 1 and 
then set the guideline as a residual to achieve a certain external reserve 
objective. 2 While the ability of monetary policy to achieve growth and 
employment is severely limited in a small open economy, an expansionary 
guideline would tend to facilitate growth at the expense of a reduction in the 
external reserves. 3 
Table 2 presents the .data on each of the variables in identity 1 and in par-
ticular shows the external reserve outcome associated with the credit guidelines 
and the other variables in identity 1. It will be observed that the decreases in 
the external reserves in 1979 and 1981 were offset by increases in 1978 and 
1980 so that over the period a marginal increase of £68m was recorded. 
With regard to the question of whether the credit guideline achieved the 
desired external reserve outcome, no precise answer can be given as forecasts 
for the BLG, NEALBs and the 'other' variables are not published. However, 
by comparing the available published estimates with the actual outcomes some 
indication can be given. This approach may also indicate some of the 
difficulties involved. 
1See, for example, Laidler (1981). 
2For an outline of how the Central Bank calculates the guidelines, see Murray (1979). 
3See, for example, Murray (1980). 
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TABLE 2: External Reserves, Money Supply and Domestic Credit: 
1978-1981 (£m) 
Change in Change Change Private Foreign Bank 
External in Net in Sector Currency Lending 
Reserves External Money Credit Based to 
Assets of Supply Subject to Lending Government 
Licensed (M3) Guideline 
Period Banks 
R + NEALBs = M' (PC 
Dec '77 - Dec '78 51.2 4.5 934.5 814 
.Feb '79 - Feb '80 -262.6 -42.4 678.5 673 
Feb '80 - Feb '81 331.5 -319.4 1,125.1 573.1 
Feb '81 - Feb '82 -50.7 -71.8 953.8 792.3 
Dec '78 - Feb '79 -1.4 -41.4 
Change over Period 68.0 
Source: Derived from consolidated balance sheet of banking system 
Various Central Bank Bulletins 
+ FCBL + 
129.1 
323.6 
Note: (a) Data from January and February 1978 are added to obtain Rover period 
(b) External reserves are exclusive of gold revaluations 
BLG + 
176.9 
230.3 
433.7 
298.6 
Other 
Others) 
-112.1 
-48.9 
-217.4 
-14.6 
In 1978, the stated intention was that" ... the import cover afforded by the 
official external reserves is high at present by international standards and . . . 
some reduction can be tolerated". 4 However, a £320.7m breach of the guideline 
was more than offset by a £348.2m underestimate of the change in 
the money supply and a £233. lm overestimate of BLG (1978 is the only year a 
forecast is available for this variable). Thus, contrary to expectations, the 
expansionary credit guideline was associated with an increase in the external 
reserves of £5lm. 
In 1979, the decrease in the reserves of £262.6m would seem to be at odds 
with the stated objective of having " ... little change in the external reserves". 5 
The increase in oil prices and the subsequent change in the terms of trade 
would seem to largely explain the fall in reserves. (The effect of increased 
prices on the demand for money does not seem to have materialized until 
1980.) A contributory factor was that the increase in FCBL was not matched 
by an equal decrease in NEALBs. This implies that some banks were 
borrowing abroad and on lending to the private sector while they or their non-
resident customers were simultaneously using domestic resources to repay 
foreign indebtedness. An underestimate of the change in the money supply of 
£53. 7m was almost offset by a £46.Sm breach of the guideline. Finally, 
speculative capital inflows associated with entry into the EMS may have 
contributed to an increase in the external reserves. 
In setting the quantitative credit guideline for 1980 the Central Bank 
temporarily avoided a decision between the growth and reserve objectives by 
encouraging the private sector to borrow abroad. Commenting on its reserve 
objective, the Bank stated that it was " ... seeking to avoid introducing a 
deflationary element into economic policy. The broad approach adopted is 
that maintenance of reserve adequacy this year would be achieved by external 
4Q.B. 1, 1978, p. 25. 
sQ.B. 1, 1979, p. 24. 
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borrowing by the private as well as the public sector". 6 This was achieved by 
issuing a restrictive 13 % credit guideline which would ". . . induce some 
recourse by the private sector to external financing". 7 In the event this 
approach was particularly successful with the external reserves increasing by 
£331.5m. It may not, however, have been entirely expected as the money 
supply was underestimated by a considerable £301. 7m. Also, despite the 
termination of the FCBL exemption in October 1980, this variable was under-
estimated by approximately £184m. It is noticeable that, unlike 1979, the 
NEALB's variable moved closely with the FCBL variable. 
Finally, in 1981 the intention was that the reserves would be maintained at 
an 'adequate level' and concern was expressed at the growing level of foreign 
indebtedness. Little information is available for this period but it is likely that 
the outcome was relatively more in line with intentions. · 
The above discussion omits considerations of Government Monetary 
Financing (GMF) simply because Central Bank estimates are not available for 
this variable. However, for the three guidelines between February 1979 and 
February 1982, the Central Bank underestimated the Exchequer Borrowing 
Requirement (EBR) by £230m, £317m and £383m respectively. Assuming 
these underestimates reflect underestimates in GMF and allowing for 
Government Foreign Borrowing (GFB) which adds initially to the external 
reserves, the unpredictability in government finances clearly contributed to the 
difficulties in achieving the reserve target. , 
Overall, the policy stance of the Central Bank would seem to have been 
towards accommodating the growth objective with perhaps 1981 being the 
exception. It is noticeable that a decrease of £470.5m in the net external assets 
of the Licensed Banks combined with an increase of £2,620m in Government 
Foreign Borrowing led to a £3,022.5m decrease in external finance. Thus, the 
maintenance of reserve adequacy over the period was largely achieved by 
increased foreign indebtedness. 
Liquidity 
The literature on the monetary approach to the balance of payments (MAB) 
asserts that a balance of payments disequilibrium reflects money market 
disequilibrium and that an adjustment mechanism exists whereby changes in 
the monetary base will tend to rectify imbalances in the external account. If in 
a fixed exchange rate system the Central Bank can neutralize the effect of 
changes in the external reserves on the monetary base, then the adjustment 
process is broken and monetary base control of the money supply may be 
feasible in the short run. 
Neutralization is, however, not possible except under certain conditions. 
( One important condition is the existence of imperfect substitution between 
foreign and domestic financial assets in investors' portfolios. 8) But controls 
such as exchange controls and quantitative credit guidelines, which are not 
usually discussed in this context, significantly increase regulation in the money 
markets and consequently should increase the degree of independence the 
6Q.B. 1, 1980, p. 13. 
7Q.B. 1, 1980, p. 13. 
8See, for example, M. Obstfeld (1982). 
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TABLE 3: Central Bank Balance Sheet - Change over Period (£m) 
Assets Liabilities 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1978 1979 1980 
External Reserves (R) 51.0 -262.7 331.5 -50.7 Currency (Cu) 89.7 96.3 94.8 
Central Bank Lending Licensed Banks 
to Licensed Banks (CC8 ) 44.1 69.5 -176.5 47.7 Reserves (RE) 119.7 -58.6 211.5 
Central Bank Lending Government 
to Government (CCc) -3.8 74.3 144.7 51.6 Deposits (G.D.) -103.3 -173.2 -48.8 
Other -6.9 20.8 37.7 19.4 Other -21.7 37.4 79.9 
84.4 -98.1 337.4 68.0 84.4 -98.1 337.4 
Source: Various Central Bank Bulletins 
Notes: 1. 1978 is from December to December. Remaining years are from February to February 
2. CC8 = Exchequer Bills rediscounted for banks + ACIBs + secured advances to banks + short term credit facility 
3. CCc = Exchequer Bills + Irish Government Securities + Exchequer overdraft facility 
4. RE includes statutory deposits 
5. External Reserves are exclusive of gold revaluations 
6. CC8 does not include foreign currency swaps, data for which is not available 
1981 
68.8 
-63.1 
-26.4 
88.7 
68.0 
Central Bank has in monetary policy. In particular, since credit guidelines 
control lending to the private sector and exchange controls can be expected to 
modify capital flows through the external account, the Central Bank can use 
additional instruments to influence liquidity and hence interest rates in the 
economy. Instruments such as Central Bank credit to the Licensed Banks (CCB 
is defined in Table 3 to include the rediscounting of Exchequer bills, secured 
advances and the short term credit facility9), changes in the primary reserve 
ratios and the discount rate can be used to remove or inject liquidity into the 
system and therefore enable the implementation of a type of stabilization 
policy in interest rates. This is a major advantage from using credit guidelines 
in that the disadvantages of flexible interest rates such as the implications for 
Exchequer financing, industrial investment, inflation and expectations are 
avoided. However, as is demonstrated below, the Central Bank can also 
neutralize interest rates in the short run by accepting a lower level of external 
reserves and a lower primary reserve ratio. 
Table 3 shows a categorization of the Central Bank balance sheet which 
emphasises the CCB variable. The generally inverse relationship between the 
external reserve changes and CCB is evident. Also it is noticeable that the 
Licensed Banks recorded a lower reserve base in 1979 and 1981 despite 
increases in lending. 
Table 4 gives quarterly figures for CCB. The 1978 figures would suggest a 
form of stabilization policy in interest rates. If the first three quarters of 1979 
are compared with the remaining quarter in 1979 plus the four quarters in 
1980 the data again suggests a stabilization policy in interest rates. However, in 
October 1979 the Central Bank reduced the primary and secondary reserve 
ratios for the Associated Banks and decreased the primary but increased the 
secondary ratio for the Non-Associated Banks. These changes combined with a 
£118m increase in the external reserves in the fourth quarter of 1979 largely 
explain the reduction of £252m in CCB in this fourth quarter. Moreover, the 
repayment of CCB in 1980 reflects an increase in the external reserves which in 
turn is largely explained by banks borrowing abroad under the. foreign 
currency based lending exemption. 
TABLE 4: Central Bank Credit to the Licensed Banks (£m) 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
34.8 
128.1 
-57.2 
115.7 
177.0 
-61.8 
-61.0 
16.8 
-65.0 
-45.4 
-252.4 
7.5 
Note: For 1978, Quarters are from December to March and for 1979 and 1980, from February to May. 
Source: Central Bank Bulletins 
This reduction of indebtedness and the injection of liquidity via the foreign 
currency exemption effectively amounts to a neutralization of interest rates. 
The implications are that, firstly, the external reserves are at a lower level since 
9The CC8 variable does not include foreign currency swaps which is an important short run liquidity 
instrument. No data are available on this variable. 
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if interest rates had been allowed to increase, capital inflows would have 
occurred. Referring to the year 1979, Murray (1980) comments:" ... there was 
a conscious decision to take action to prevent (interest) rates going even higher, 
in recognition of the burden this would have placed on the economy; it was, 
however, at the cost of a larger fall than we would have liked in the external_ 
reserves" .10 Secondly, the primary reserve ratio is lower and private sector 
credit is likely to be higher than if the authorities had not intervened. Finally, 
the lower. interest rates have implications for income distribution and the 
allocation of resources. (An intensification of credit rationing, for example.) 
This latter point is also true for any stabilization policy in interest rates. 
A similar situation emerged in 1981 as the Central Bank extended £47. 7m in 
credit to the banks and reduced the primary reserve ratio from 12% in 
February 1981 to 10% in January 1982. In addition, most categories of banks 
had a shortfall in their secondary reserve ratio. As in 1979, the reserve base was 
also lower at the end of the period. 
There is a floor, set by the need to maintain prudent primary reserve ratios, 
to this type of interest neutralization. However, over the period, the data 
indicate that interest rates have not been increased to the extent called for by a 
policy to achieve external balance and that the broad thrust of policy has been 
to accommodate the credit guidelines. 
Enforcement 
It is informative to examine Central Bank enforcement of the credit guide-
lines over the period as this may indicate the existence and timing of credit 
rationing. Also it is important because, as is demonstrated at the end of this 
section, policy and enforcement combined to change the Associated and Non-
Associated Banks' relative lending base and therefore their relative long-run 
profits. 
Assuming credit rationing exists, the main incentive to breach a credit 
guideline is the extra profit that can be earned on excess lending. It requires 
two distinct measures to remove this incentive. Firstly, it is necessary to impose 
a special deposit measure which requires a bank to place on deposit with the 
Central Bank an amount equivalent to the excess lending. The interest paid on 
this deposit is calculated so that an immediate loss is incurred on excess 
lending. Secondly, because a bank's lending base is increased by excess 
lending, which in turn is used to calculate next period's guideline, the bank 
increases its (long run) profit. To remove this incentive it is necessary to make 
an appropriate deduction from the bank's permitted growth of credit so that 
the bank returns to the correct lending base at the end of the period. These 
two enforcement measures - special deposits and market base deductions -
are consistent and sufficient to obtain compliance with the guideline. It was 
not, however, until the end of 1981 that the Central Bank implemented both 
measures. 
In 1978, a 50% capital inflow requirement and a temporary penal 
rediscount policy used in June proved ineffective and, given the demand for 
credit, as a consequence the credit guideline was abandoned after nine 
months. 
10Murray (1980), p. 117. 
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For the second six-month guideline, a special deposit requirement was 
introduced along with a penal rediscount policy and the 50% capital inflow 
requirement. Ironically, the data indicate that those banks liable for special 
deposits (mainly the Associated Banks) were also responsible for the 4. 7% 
breach of the guideline and that those banks who faced essentially the same 
enforcement measures as in the previous unsuccessful guideline actually 
complied with the guideline. Perhaps the reason why the special deposit 
· measure did not moderate Associated Bank lending lies in the ambiguous 
criterion on which it was based. The deposits were non interest bearing, but· 
the extent of the overlending and the length of time to the end of the period 
would determine the effect on excess lending profit. No measure ~as intro-
duced to remove the long-run profit incentive. The special deposits which were 
rdnforced by a progressively penal rediscount policy were not sufficient to act 
as a deterrent. 
The year 1979 gives an opportunity to examine the relationship between 
enforcement and credit rationing. It is useful to refer to the following data in 
Table 5 for non-government lending (NGL) which, although it includes 
foreign currency based lending exempt from the guideline, can still be used to 
illustrate the main points. 
TABLE 5: Non-Government Lending (NGL) Monthly% change 
1979/1980 
Base £m Mar Apr May Jun Ju! Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 
NGL 3,571.1 6.2 1.0 2.1 3.6 -0.1 0.3 4.7 0 0.9 1.3 -0.9 2.0 
The guideline was initially enforced by a special deposit requirement and 
was backdated by one month to February 1979. The Associated Banks had 
increased lending by 8.3% during March compared to a 0.5% increase by the 
Non-Associated Banks and their lending capacity for the remainder of the 
period was therefore reduced. Redebiting of interest in March would partly 
explain this large increase in Associated Banks' lending. As the NGL data 
indicate, lending moderated in April and May but began to accelerate again in 
June. 
At this point the Central Bank introduced additional enforcement measures 
to curtail lending. Given the increasing indebtedness to the Central Bank, the 
penalty on rediscounting was to be increased. The special deposit criterion was 
redefined to explicitly account for profits earned on excess. lending. The 
interest paid on special deposits or, equivalently, the interest on a tranche of 
bank deposits would be varied so that the "cost to a bank of either measure 
would outweigh any profit on the corresponding amount of excess lending" .11 
Moreover, nine banks were required to place special deposits with the Central 
Bank at "rates substantially below those which the bank normally pays on 
deposits" .12 As reflected in the NGL Table, credit expansion now moderated in 
July and August but the interim guideline was breached by 4.6% by the 
11 Q.B. 2, 1979, p. 21. 
12Q.B. 3, 1979, p. 18. 
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Associated Banks and their indebtedness to the Central Bank increased to 
£375m, reflecting falls in the external reserves. 
Credit continued to increase in September and the Central Bank reiterated 
its intention to require special deposits and warned that "any such excess might 
be taken into consideration in the application to a particular bank of monetary 
policy for 1980" .13 This was the first indication that the market base incentive 
would be removed. Credit expansion now moderated with virtually no change 
in NGL in October and November. 
By the end of the third quarter, the Associated Banks had already exceeded 
the guideline for the year and their indebtedness to the Central Bank had 
increased to £437m, reflecting the continued fall in the external reserves. As 
discussed in the section on liquidity, the changes in the required reserves in 
October 1979 significantly contributed to reducing this indebtedness. In the 
final quarter, as the data below in Table 6 indicates, the Associated Banks 
decreased their lending to bring their cumulative increase within the guideline 
limits. The Non-Associated Banks, on the other hand, were much more consistent 
in lending over the period. 
TABLE 6: Private Sector Credit, Subject to the Guideline 
Quarterly% Change 1979/1980 
Associated Banks 
Non-Associated Banks 
Source: Central Bank Bulletins 
Ql 
11.9 
4.7 
Q2 
3.7 
6.2 
Q3 
3.4 
5.7 
Q4 
~0.9 
4.0 
Year 
17.5 
22.4 
Although the Non-Associated Banks and foreign currency based lending 
may have acted as alternative sources of finance, the data indicate that the 
Associated Banks conducted non price credit rationing in the fourth quarter of 
1979/'80. 
Moreover, an examination of the Associated Banks' analysis of advances 
table in this quarter shows that the non prime borrowers experienced large 
decreases in lending. 14 Lending to the non prime, Financial, Total Personal, 
Housing and Other personal lending categories all decreased, by 10.1, 4. 7, 7.6 
and 0.8 percentage points respectively,15 whereas lending to the prime sectors 
such as Manufacturing, Building and Construction and the 'Others' categories 
increased by 8, 3 and 13.4 percentage points respectively. This may indicate 
differential effects from credit rationing. In general, the Central Bank 
enforcement efforts over the period suggest that credit rationing did exist and 
the neutralization of interest rates ( as discussed in the previous section on 
Liquidity) would have intensified the extent of this rationing. 
There is some evidence that rationing was continued into the 1980/81 
period. As the data below in Tables 7 and 8 show, the banks made full use of 
13Q.B. 3, 1979, p. 19. 
14See Browne and O'Connell (1979). 
15Total Personal lending equals lending to the Housing and Other personal sectors. The analysis is complicated by 
the existence of sectoral guidelines on lending to the Financial and Other personal categories. Lending to 
Housing is not subject to a sectoral guideline. 
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the foreign currency lending exemption while pursuing conservative domestic 
lending policies. It is noticeable that lending bases were only maximized in the 
final quarter. 
TABLE 7: Sector Credit, Subject to the Guideline 
Cumulative % Change 1980/1981 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Associated Banks 2.4 -0.5 5.1 12.7 
Non-Associated Banks 1.6 4.0 8.1 14.3 
TABLE 8: Foreign Currency Based Lending, Exempt from the Guideline 
Quarterly Change 1980/1981 (£m) 
Associated Banks 
Non-Associated Banks 
Source: Central Bank Bulletins 
Ql 
5.5 
78.4 
Q2 
32.4 
29.6 
Q3 
13.3 
9.4 
Q4 
35.1 
119.9 
Year 
86.3 
237.3 
The Central Bank's approach was to issue a restrictive credit guideline in 
order to encourage the Licensed Banks to borrow abroad and this approach 
obviously succeeded. It also indicated the Central Bank's confidence in its 
ability to enforce the guideline. However, the enforcement measures consisting 
of a special deposit requirement were less forceful than in the previous period 
given the reduction in indebtedness to the Central Bank. In the event, no 
additional measures were required as at no stage were the guidelines likely to 
be breached. The above data indicate a conservatism in lending and this could 
be interpreted as an over-reaction to the experiences in 1979. On this the 
Central Bank comments: "The surge in the extension of credit toward the end 
of the . . . year may have owed something to the scope for increased lending 
within the guideline; this, in turn, may have been attributable partly to the 
pursuit by the banks of conservative lending policies earlier in the year in order 
to avoid the danger of breaching the guideline". 16 If this were the case, an 
intertemporal reallocation of resources occurred which would have been only 
partly alleviated by the FCBL exemption. 
Finally, in 1981 the Central Bank was again obliged to enforce the credit 
guideline. All Licensed Banks were within the guideline at the interim stage 
but in the third quarter the Associated Banks increased lending by 7 .1 % to 
bring their cumulative increase to 14.6%. The Central Bank reiterated its 
intention to call for special deposits and, in addition, warned that "any excess 
(lending) . . . would be taken into consideration in the application of 
monetary policy in the next credit policy year" .17 
In the final quarter, the Associated Banks reduced the rate of increase in. 
lending to 1.6% to give an overall increase of 16.3%. In contrast, there was a 
marked acceleration in Non-Associated Bank lending in the fourth quarter 
when a 9.2% increase was recorded. A very marginal increase in the earlier 
16 Q.B. 1, 1981, pp. 23, 24. 
17 Q.B. 4, 1981, p. 19. 
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part of the year, however, brought the Non-Associated Banks' cumulative 
increase to only 14.8%. 
The overall breach of the guideline was considered marginal by the Central 
Bank and no calls were made for special deposits. However, for banks which 
exceeded the guideline "a corresponding deduction was made from the growth 
of credit permitted in 1982" .18 The 14% credit guideline for 1982/83 will not 
therefore be standard across Licensed Banks. 
An examination of the analysis of advances table for the Associated Banks 
again indicates a reduction in lending to the Total Personal sector in the final 
quarter although there was a marginal increase in lending to the Financial 
sector. Other prime categories such as Agriculture, Services and Manufac-
turing all recorded relatively large percentage increases in lending. Thus, 
there is again evidence of a movement away from non prime borrowers when 
rationing is necessary. Unlike 1979, no personal lending guidelines were issued 
in this period. With regard to the Non-Associated Banks, the increase in 
lending in the final quarter was largely to the Service, Manufacturing and 
Agricultural categories, which may suggest an excess demand for credit and 
therefore the existence of credit rationing. 
Licensed Banks' Lending Base 
Table 9 shows the various bank categories share of total lending over the 
period. It will be observed that the Associated Banks initially increased their 
share of total lending from 59.9% in December 1977 to 63.5% in March 1979 
and that by February 1982 their share was reduced to 58 % . Since the amount 
of lending largely dictates a bank's profitability, Table 9 is an indication of 
relative profitability between the bank categories. These shifts in lending can 
be largely explained by Central Bank credit policy and by how the guidelines 
were enforced. 
TABLE 9: Banks' Share of Total Lending: 1978-1981 (%) 
Dec Sep Feb Mar Feb Feb Feb 
1977 1978 1979 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Associated Banks 59.9 62.0 61.8 63.5 60.1 57.7 58.0 
Non-Associated Banks 40.1 38.0 38.2 36.5 39.9 42.3 42.0 
of which: 
North American 8.0 6.3 6.5 6.2 6.7 8.2 8.2 
Merchant 11.9 12.0 12.1 11.4 12.1 12.3 12.3 
Industrial 15.4 15.5 15.7 15.2 15.1 14.3 14.1 
Other 4.8 14.1 4.0 3.7 5.9 7.4 7.3 
All Licensed Banks 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Base £m 2538.7 3195.8 3418.7 3665.0 4281.9 5178. 7 5989.2 
Source: Compiled from data given in various Central Bank Bulletins 
Note: Certain banks in the 'other' category were allowed exemptions from the guidelines. No information 
is available on these exemptions. 
Between December 1977 and September 1978 (the termination date of the 
first guideline) the Associated Banks increased lending share by 2% due to 
18 QB. 1, 1982, p. 27. 
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greater excess lending relative to the Non-Associated Banks. As already stated, 
the guideline in this period was not effectively enforced and the Associated 
Banks had increased lending by 30.3% by September 1978 compared to the 
Non-Associated Banks' 19.3%. For the second guideline period (September 
1978 to March 1979) the Associated Banks increased their share by a further 
1. 5 % for the same reason. On this occasion the relative figures are 1 7. 5 % 
increase in lending for the Associated Banks compared to the Non-Associated 
Banks lending exactly the stipulated 10%. Between February 1979 and 
February 1980 ( the third guideline period) the Associated Banks' share of 
lending was reduced by 3.4% due to a number of factors. Firstly, the guideline 
was backdated by one month and this reduced the lending share by 1. 7 % . 
(The Associated Banks increased lending by £179.5m in March relative to the 
Non-Associated Banks' £6.6m.) Secondly, the Associated Banks did not 
perfectly maximize their lending base over the period (a 0.4% deficiency) 
compared to the Non-Associated Banks' excess lending of 4.4%. Thirdly, the 
Non-Associated Banks had greater FCBL relative to the Associated Banks 
(£86.3m as compared to £48. 7m). These combined to reduce the Associated 
Banks' lending share by 3.4%. 
For the fourth guideline period, the Associated Banks' share continued to 
fall as they failed to perfectly maximize their lending base by 0.3% compared 
to the Non-Associated Banks breaching the guideline by 1.3%. As in the 
previous period, the Non-Associated Banks also had greater FCBL (£237 .3m) 
relative to the Associated Banks (£86.3m). For these reasons the Associated 
Banks' lending share was eroded by a further 2.4%. 
The Associated Banks regained 0.3% of the lending market in the final 
guideline period by having excess lending relative to the Non-Associated Banks 
but the stated intention of the Central Bank to impose market base deductions 
may remove this gain. The Non-Associated Banks did not in fact maximize 
their lending base in this period and were clearly more concerned to reduce 
their net external liabilities. 
No attempt is made here to account for the effect of the special deposit 
measures on profits. The data in Table 4 is therefore an indicator of long-term 
profits. Also it cannot be demonstrated what the relative shares would have 
been in the absence of credit guidelines. However, with the introduction of 
market base deductions in 1981 and the increasing concern of the Central 
Bank for external indebtedness, shifts in the lending base are not likely to be so 
pronounced in the future. 
Conclusz"on 
The compliance by the Licensed Banks to the credit guidelines indicates the 
close degree of control the Central Bank can exert on private sector credit. 
This control in turn should facilitate the attainment of an external reserve 
objective but, as the data in this paper suggest, variables such as the EBR, the 
money supply and exogenous shocks to the system may have led to the external 
reserve outcomes not being entirely in accord with the Central Bank's 
intentions. An important aspect of policy over the period was the FCBL 
exemption which effectively allowed a reprieve from an overly restrictive 
monetary policy. 
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A major advantage of credit guidelines is that interest rates are not required 
to regulate the demand for credit. Given exchange controls, this allows scope 
for the Central Bank to conduct a type of stabilization policy in interest rates. 
The evidence in this paper suggests that interest rates were more stable and. 
lower than if the Central Bank had not intervened. This has several advantages 
in terms of exchequer financing, industrial investment and the EMS obligation 
but there are also disadvantages in that the external reserves are lower and 
there are income and resource allocation effects. 
An examination of Central Bank enforcement suggested that credit 
rationing did exist but although no evidence was presented on the extent of this 
rationing, some evidence was given on the differential effects. Finally, the 
paper showed how policy and enforcement combined to reduce the Associated 
Banks' relative lending share by £120m since 1978 and £330m since March 
1979. 
A more complete evaluation of credit guidelines will require more evidence 
on the above issues but this is likely to be forthcoming as credit guidelines are 
certain to remain an integral part of monetary policy in Ireland in the 
foreseeable future. 
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